WHILE Pakistan remained preoccupied with facilitating talks between the US and Iran, the public discourse largely overlooked critical developments on other fronts, particularly internal security challenges, a worsening relationship with Afghanistan, and the approaching first anniversary of the Pakistan-India stand-off.
The enthusiasm surrounding Pakistan’s role in a high-stakes global diplomatic effort has, in many ways, diverted attention from pressing domestic and regional concerns. In this fixation with great power diplomacy, media and opinion-makers have also failed to adequately reflect on how the war is affecting the ordinary citizen. While one can’t look at the sky and ground at the same time, walking while gazing upwards can be dangerous, especially on a bumpy terrain.
We need a reality check: since the US-Israel war with Iran started on Feb 28, Pakistan’s security situation has worsened. If one looks at the data and compares the two quarters from October-December 2025 and January-March 2026, the total number of attacks rose from 128 to 169, while fatalities more than doubled from 169 to 349, showing a clear rise in both the frequency and severity of violence.
The rise was largely driven by TTP, the Gul Bahadur group, IS-K, and other groups with similar objectives, whose attacks increased by 68 per cent (from 81 to 136). In contrast, Baloch insurgent attacks declined by 25pc (from 44 to 33), but fatalities surged by 630pc (from 23 to 168), indicating a shift towards fewer yet deadlier operations.
April also witnessed 55 attacks, indicating that the Urumqi talks had little to no effect. These attacks do not include cross-border terrorist incursions, which continue, with both Afghanistan and Pakistan trading barbs and accusing each other of cross-border firing. All this affects civilian populations and the livelihoods of people living along the border. Meanwhile, a new feature gradually gaining ground in the country’s security landscape is the growing use of commercial and modified unmanned aerial devices. Last week, militants launched three quadcopter attacks in Hangu, and the expansion of such attacks from Bannu and North Waziristan to other tribal districts has been noted.
This is a clear indication that Pakistan’s security environment has entered a new phase, one that reflects not merely escalation, but transformation. The country is no longer dealing with a single-dimensional terrorist threat; instead, it faces a layered contest involving cross-border sanctuaries, retaliatory strikes, and an expanding information war.
Equally significant is the doctrinal shift in militant tactics, where low-cost quadcopter drones have altered the operational landscape. These tools are not merely tactical innovations but instruments of psychological dominance, enabling stand-off attacks on checkpoints, police stations and civilian areas while amplifying propaganda gains.
The country is no longer dealing with a single-dimensional terrorist threat.
Since 2024, this convergence has become visible in the open record, with Pakistan striking across the Afghan border, militant groups openly deploying drones, and even the Afghan Taliban acknowledging cross-border drone activity. This evolution is geographically anchored in two corridors: the northern belt linking eastern Afghanistan to Bajaur, Waziristan, and Bannu, and the southern routes feeding instability into the Sibi-Bolan-Quetta axis. At the core of this shift lies the resurgence of TTP, operating with renewed confidence under perceived sanctuary conditions.
Pakistan is busy in a kinetic campaign on all these fronts — from Balochistan to the KP’s tribal districts and inside Afghanistan. In the case of pre-emptive strikes across the border, precision is particularly needed to avoid collateral damage. This comes through effective and foolproof intelligence, which may be a critical link in this context. In such a setting, the state’s advantage will depend less on rhetoric and more on integrated defence, evidentiary credibility, and a calibrated political engagement that ties diplomacy with Kabul to verifiable security outcomes.
The outcome of the Urumqi talks, a channel facilitated by China between Afghanistan and Pakistan, is not well known, as most of it is based on unverifiable sources. Yet another diplomatic channel is facilitated by Turkiye, but it seems that neither side is interested in showing flexibility and finding ways to reduce dependence on the other.
Pakistan has opened its land and sea routes for Iran, while Iran has allowed Pakistan a passage to Central Asia. Apparently, this move is a counter-response by Pakistan to the Taliban regime’s efforts to diversify its trade relations with Central Asian states and explore new trade routes. Afghanistan’s desire to expand its connectivity is not new; it has been trying to materialise this vision for decades.
However, as long as its borders with Pakistan remained open, diverting trade routes was less attractive. This time, Pakistan has closed its borders as a punitive measure against the Taliban’s non-cooperation on terrorist networks targeting this country, prompting Afghanistan to rapidly look for alternative options.
By utilising Iranian routes, Pakistan has opened a new trade corridor to Central Asian markets such as Uzbekistan. These developments aim to stabilise the region by replacing illicit activities with transparent, documented commercial activity. This economic cooperation provides Pakistan with a strategic alternative, particularly as tensions and closures persist along the Afghan border.
However, has the state considered whether ignoring the shortest routes and adopting longer trade routes is viable in the long run? Can Iran be an alternative to Afghanistan for connectivity ambitions with Central Asia and beyond? Does Pakistan trust Iran, and is Tehran really entering a new phase in its relationship with Islamabad? What are the future prospects of this arrangement?
No doubt, the Taliban are not acting as rational actors and are reluctant to take action against terrorist networks with which they have long-standing partnerships. A more pragmatic framework, combining punitive measures with cooperation, would have been more effective.
However, Pakistan’s dilemma is that Afghanistan is its only neighbour that falls within its sphere of influence, and Afghanistan is often perceived in a way similar to how the US views countries within its own sphere of influence.
The writer is a security analyst.
Published in Dawn, May 3rd, 2026
